Seccomp security profiles for Docker
Secure computing mode (Seccomp) is a Linux kernel feature. You can use it to restrict the actions available within the container. The seccomp()
system call operates on the seccomp state of the calling process. You can use this feature to restrict your application’s access.
This feature is available only if Docker has been built with seccomp and the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP
enabled. To check if your kernel supports seccomp:
$ cat /boot/config-`uname -r` | grep CONFIG_SECCOMP= CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
Note: seccomp profiles require seccomp 2.2.1 and are only available starting with Debian 9 “Stretch”, Ubuntu 15.10 “Wily”, and Fedora 22. To use this feature on Ubuntu 14.04, Debian Wheezy, or Debian Jessie, you must download the latest static Docker Linux binary. This feature is currently not available on other distributions.
Passing a profile for a container
The default seccomp profile provides a sane default for running containers with seccomp and disables around 44 system calls out of 300+. It is moderately protective while providing wide application compatibility. The default Docker profile (found here has a JSON layout in the following form:
{ "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO", "architectures": [ "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64", "SCMP_ARCH_X86", "SCMP_ARCH_X32" ], "syscalls": [ { "name": "accept", "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW", "args": [] }, { "name": "accept4", "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW", "args": [] }, ... ] }
When you run a container, it uses the default profile unless you override it with the security-opt
option. For example, the following explicitly specifies the default policy:
$ docker run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=/path/to/seccomp/profile.json hello-world
Significant syscalls blocked by the default profile
Docker’s default seccomp profile is a whitelist which specifies the calls that are allowed. The table below lists the significant (but not all) syscalls that are effectively blocked because they are not on the whitelist. The table includes the reason each syscall is blocked rather than white-listed.
Syscall | Description |
---|---|
acct | Accounting syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by CAP_SYS_PACCT . |
add_key | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
adjtimex | Similar to clock_settime and settimeofday , time/date is not namespaced. |
bpf | Deny loading potentially persistent bpf programs into kernel, already gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
clock_adjtime | Time/date is not namespaced. |
clock_settime | Time/date is not namespaced. |
clone | Deny cloning new namespaces. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN for CLONE_* flags, except CLONE_USERNS . |
create_module | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. |
delete_module | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by CAP_SYS_MODULE . |
finit_module | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by CAP_SYS_MODULE . |
get_kernel_syms | Deny retrieval of exported kernel and module symbols. |
get_mempolicy | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by CAP_SYS_NICE . |
init_module | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. Also gated by CAP_SYS_MODULE . |
ioperm | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by CAP_SYS_RAWIO . |
iopl | Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels. Already gated by CAP_SYS_RAWIO . |
kcmp | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping CAP_PTRACE . |
kexec_file_load | Sister syscall of kexec_load that does the same thing, slightly different arguments. |
kexec_load | Deny loading a new kernel for later execution. |
keyctl | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
lookup_dcookie | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. |
mbind | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by CAP_SYS_NICE . |
mount | Deny mounting, already gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
move_pages | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. |
name_to_handle_at | Sister syscall to open_by_handle_at . Already gated by CAP_SYS_NICE . |
nfsservctl | Deny interaction with the kernel nfs daemon. |
open_by_handle_at | Cause of an old container breakout. Also gated by CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH . |
perf_event_open | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. |
personality | Prevent container from enabling BSD emulation. Not inherently dangerous, but poorly tested, potential for a lot of kernel vulns. |
pivot_root | Deny pivot_root , should be privileged operation. |
process_vm_readv | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping CAP_PTRACE . |
process_vm_writev | Restrict process inspection capabilities, already blocked by dropping CAP_PTRACE . |
ptrace | Tracing/profiling syscall, which could leak a lot of information on the host. Already blocked by dropping CAP_PTRACE . |
query_module | Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules. |
quotactl | Quota syscall which could let containers disable their own resource limits or process accounting. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
reboot | Don’t let containers reboot the host. Also gated by CAP_SYS_BOOT . |
request_key | Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring, which is not namespaced. |
set_mempolicy | Syscall that modifies kernel memory and NUMA settings. Already gated by CAP_SYS_NICE . |
setns | Deny associating a thread with a namespace. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
settimeofday | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by CAP_SYS_TIME . |
stime | Time/date is not namespaced. Also gated by CAP_SYS_TIME . |
swapon | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
swapoff | Deny start/stop swapping to file/device. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
sysfs | Obsolete syscall. |
_sysctl | Obsolete, replaced by /proc/sys. |
umount | Should be a privileged operation. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
umount2 | Should be a privileged operation. |
unshare | Deny cloning new namespaces for processes. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN , with the exception of unshare --user . |
uselib | Older syscall related to shared libraries, unused for a long time. |
userfaultfd | Userspace page fault handling, largely needed for process migration. |
ustat | Obsolete syscall. |
vm86 | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
vm86old | In kernel x86 real mode virtual machine. Also gated by CAP_SYS_ADMIN . |
Run without the default seccomp profile
You can pass unconfined
to run a container without the default seccomp profile.
$ docker run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=unconfined debian:jessie \ unshare --map-root-user --user sh -c whoami
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